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LOCAL GROWTH MANAGEMENT AND
REGIONAL HOUSING NEEDS
Many American municipal governments, concerned about the
shape and rate of growth in their communities, have adopted sophis-
ticated uses of their police and tax powers to guide the course of so-
cioeconomic development.' Most state courts,2 and particularly the
United States Supreme Court,3 have eschewed an interventionist role
I. See Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls.- An Economic and LegalAnaysis, 86
YALE L.J. 385, 388 (1977); Rose, Conflict Between Regionalism and Home Rule: The
Ambivalence of Recent Planning Law Decisions, 31 RUTGERS L. REV. 1 (1978).
The "police power" concept encompasses the inherent right of state and local gov-
ernments to enact legislation protecting the health, safety, morals or general welfare
of the people within their jurisdiction. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 389, 389-410 (1978) [hereinafter cited as NOWAK], for a gen-
eral overview of the development of the "police power" concept in relation to the
exercise of various governmental interests.
Courts apply one of two tests in determining whether an exercise of the police
power is constitutional. The "reasonable means" test requires only that the means
chosen by a governmental entity reasonably or rationally relate to the effecutation of
a legitimate public purpose. The much stricter "strict scrutiny" test requires that the
means chosen relate in the most narrow way to attainment of a compelling public
interest. As a result, a court applying "strict scrutiny" will invalidate ordinances not
supported by a compelling interest, or which are either overinclusive or underinclu-
sive. See generally F. MICHELMAN & T. SANDALOW, GOVERNMENT IN URBAN AR-
EAs 308-10 (1970).
2. Eg., Vickers v. Gloucester Township, 37 N.J. 232, 181 A.2d 129 (1962), cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 233 (1963) (municipal freedom of action under zoning and general
police powers read broadly to allow total prohibition of trailer parks). See generally
Comment, The Needfor Accommodation in Growth Control Ordinances: Associated
Homebuilders of the Greater Eastbay, Inc. v. City of Livermore, 12 U.S.F.L. REv.
357 (1978).
3. The United States Supreme Court apparently has attempted in recent years to
steer land-use cases out of the federal courts.
In Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) the Supreme Court upheld the validity of
an urban renewal program, and set the federal tone of approach to municipal land
use programs. The Court stated that the choice of a policy goal and an implementing
strategy by a local legislative body is conclusive unless some constitutionally pro-
tected interest is impaired by the governmental action. Id at 32.
Permissive Supreme Court review of municipal land use policy contrasts sharply
with Congress' activism in the land use and growth management field since World
War II, and particularly during the last decade. Though Congress has not enacted a
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with respect to these growth management plans. They accord a gen-
eral presumption of validity to municipal land use policies.4 Some
state courts, however, have begun to scrutinize municipal land use
policies with greater vigor.5 Activist judges employ particular socio-
economic perspectives to determine the best balance between land
use restrictions and regional needs.' By dictating the substantive
general land use law, it has taken major actions that directly and indirectly affect the
land use area. One recent study identified over one hundred federal programs that
had an impact on land and growth management. Symposium-Growth Pollcy in the
Eighties, 43 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 5, 112 & n.4 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
Symposium].
4. Compare Associated Home Builders v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 604,
557 P.2d 473, 486, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41, 54 (1976) (en banc) ("courts recognize that such
ordinances are presumed to be constitutional, and come before the court with every
intendment in their favor") with Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) (unanimous
opinion) (subject to specific constitutional limitations, the legislative enunciation of
the public interest is conclusive). Some state courts, however, have exercised more
stringent substantive review though ostensibly applying the "rational relation" test.
See, e.g., Matthews v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 218 Va. 720, 237 S.E.2d 128 (1977).
The seminal case of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), established
the general validity of a comprehensive governmental regulation of land use and the
permissibility of a local government's exercise of that authority. Specifically, Euclid
established two principles that have been pivotal in the evolution of American land
use law: (1) Government in general may regulate comprehensively land use patterns,
even if a use prohibited by a zoning ordinance would not be so noxious by itself to
warrant a finding of nuisance; and (2) State governments may delegate their regula-
tory authority in the land use field to local units of government. But see note 5 infra.
In dictum the Court tempered these broad propositions with principles of limita-
tion. The Court asserted that landowners have the right to attack the constitutional
validity of a zoning ordinance as applied to their tract of land, even though the over-
all zoning power existed and was exercised reasonably. Id at 395, quoted in Sympo-
sium, supra note 3, at 6-7 & nn.6-8. See generally D. MANDELKER & R.
CUNNINGHAM, PLANNING AND CONTROL OF LAND DEVELOPMENT 201-17 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as MANDELKER].
5. See, e.g., Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel,
67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975); notes 25-33 and accompanying text infra; Waynes-
borough Corp. v. Easttown Township Zoning Hearing Bd., 23 Pa. Commw. Ct. 137,
350 A.2d 895 (1976) (lower court correct in concluding that ordinance did not make
reasonable allowances for multifamily dwellings within the township).
Municipalities exercise their police power at the pleasure of the states. Local gov-
ernments only possess authority expressly or impliedly granted by either state consti-
tutional or legislative provisions. D. MANDELKER & D. NETSCH, STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM 147-55 (1977). Typically, states have delegated
their police power authority in the land use field to local units of government by
means of enabling legislation, which allows local governmental bodies to implement
land use planning and regulatory functions.
6. E.g., 1980 Cal. Stat. ch. 1144 § 1
The Legislature. .. declares that local government ordinances which severely
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terms of municipal growth, these courts have aroused concerns about
judicial infringement on the legislative domain.7
The term "growth management" encompasses potentially all land
restrict the number of housing units which may be constructed have an effect on
the supply of housing within the region, may exacerbate the housing market con-
ditions in surrounding jurisdictions, and may limit access to affordable housing
within the jurisdiction and in the region. . . . [I]ncreasing public need for ade-
quate housing requires that local governments properly establish the need for
such ordinances and balance the need for such ordinances against the need for
new housing opportunities.
7. Surrick v. Zoning Bd., 476 Pa. 182, 382 A.2d 105, 114-15 (1977) (Roberts, J.,
concurring). See notes 48-52 infra But see Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of
Petaluma, 522 F.2d 879 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976), in which the
Court of Appeals declared that "being neither a superlegislature nor a zoning board
of appeal, a federal court is without authority to weigh and appraise the factors con-
sidered or ignored by the legislative body in passing the challenged zoning regula-
tion." Id at 906 (footnote omitted). The concurrence in Surrick recognized that
legislative and administrative inaction could justify judicial intervention in the land
use planning process. 476 Pa. at 199 n.l, 382 A.2d at 114 n.l (1977). Cf. Southern
Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713
(1975) (township zoning ordinance which discriminated against low and moderate
cost housing invalidated; extensive trial record showed that deference to local legisla-
ture would impede measures essential to the regional welfare).
Unlike some state courts, lower federal courts generally defer to municipal zoning
decisions, sustaining the laws against constitutional attack. See Steel Hill Dev., Inc.
v. Town of Sanborton, 469 F.2d 956 (1st Cir. 1972) (rebuffing constitutional attacks
on three and six acre minimum lot size requirements). Certain lower federal courts
have relied on the abstention doctrine in order to force complaining landowners to
seek relief in state courts. See Sea Ranch Ass'n v. Cal. Coastal Zone Comm'n, 537
F.2d 1058 (9th Cir. 1976) (abstention proper when state court's interpretation of stat-
ute could leave no federal constitutional questions for federal court disposition).
The abstention doctrine is a principle of federal jurisdiction designed to allow the
state court to rule definitively on the interpretation of state law before federal court
determination of federal constitutional issues involved in the same case. The practi-
cal and policy reasons underlying the abstention doctrine are that the state court de-
terminations of the state law questions may make the federal constitutional issues
moot or present them in a different posture to federal courts. The exercise of federal
jurisdiction could be disruptive of state efforts to establish a coherent policy with re-
spect to a matter of substantial public concern. For a concise and insightful discus-
sion of the abstention doctrine see NOWAK, supra note 1, at 93-100.
In a recent case, Colorado River Water Conserv. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800
(1976), the Supreme Court reiterated that abstention from the exercise of federal
jurisdiction is the exception rather than the rule. Id at 813. Moreover, the Court
stated that the use of abstention is limited. Id at 814-17. See NOWAK, supra note 1,
at 96. See also Rose, Regionalism and Home Rule, 31 RUTGERS L. REv. 1 (1977). The
author asserts that the conflict between regionalism and home rule is more a political
than legal one, but adds that the political inability of most state legislatures to address
possible regional approaches has created a void that can tempt judicial intervention.
Id at 21. In addition, the author provides an excellent development and analysis of
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use controls, so long as the intended result is control of the rate of
development.' Zoning, the preferred growth management device, is
inherently exclusionary.9 Zoning ordinances are designed to create
districts in which some uses, activities, or structures are permitted
and others excluded. 0 The term "exclusionary zoning,"'1 however,
has an even narrower meaning.12 It refers to land use controls or
techniques which exclude certain segments of the population or types
of housing from the housing market without serving a legitimizing
public purpose. 13
A notable development is the recognition by some state courts that
municipalities have a duty14 to modify or limit their use of growth
the constitutional ramifications of growth control devices' impact on the freedom of
interstate travel. See generally MANDELKER, supra note 4, at 987-1083.
8. Simply increasing minimum lot sizes has been used as a technique to control
growth, though this technique may present exclusionary problems. Eg., Steel Hill
Dev., Inc. v. Town of Sanborton, 469 F.2d 956 (lst Cir. 1972) (increased minimum lot
size upheld since area not faced with existing demand for suburban expansion).
9. See Smith, Exclusionary Zoning, in MODERN CONTROL OF LAND DEVELOP-
MENT 103 (1979).
10. Id
11. "'Exclusionary zoning' is a phrase popularly used to describe suburban zon-
ing regulations which have the effect, if not also the purpose, of preventing the migra-
tion of low and middle income persons." Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of
Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897, 905 n.10 (9th Cir. 1975).
Conversely, the term "inclusionary zoning" refers to ordinances which encourage
or mandate the construction of a broad range of housing types, especially low and
moderate income housing. SMITH, supra note 9, at 103. See generally MANDELKER,
supra note 4, at 445-574.
12. See notes 28-33 and accompanying text infra.
13. SMITH, supra note 9.
14. For emphatic statements of this duty, see Southern Burlington County
NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975) (each munic-
ipality exerting a substantial external impact through a land use regulation has a pre-
sumptive obligation to provide reasonable opportunity for an appropriate variety of
housing to meet the needs, desires, and resources of all categories of people who may
wish to live within its boundaries); Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102,
341 N.E.2d 236, 378 N.Y.S.2d 672 (1975) (in enacting a zoning ordinance, considera-
tion must be given to regional needs and requirements). See also National Land &
Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965) (zoning may not be used to avoid
responsibilities and economic burdens which time and natural growth ultimately
bring).
Even the United States Supreme Court, usually very restrained in its approach to
municipal zoning, anticipated this duty to a broader public interest. It stated in Vil-
lage of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), that its holding in favor of
the village did not exclude the possibility of cases in which the general public interest
[Vol. 23:407
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management techniques in order to respond affirmatively to present
and future regional needs." Even state court decisions not resulting
in invalidation of zoning ordinances have expressed concern about
the impact of growth limitations on regional resource capabilities.
More importantly, growing recognition of the finiteness of many pub-
lic resources is likely to cause courts, which in the past have been
deferential to local policies, to require municipal consideration of re-
gional needs. 6
would so far outweigh the local interest that the locality would not be allowed to
stand in the way. Id at 390.
15. The first case to stress the importance of integrating regional needs and re-
sources into the municipal zoning decision was Duffcon Concrete Prod., Inc. v. Bor-
ough of Cresskill, I N.J. 509, 64 A.2d 347 (1949). The Duffcon court expressed its
viewpoint as follows:
What may be the most appropriate use of any particular property depends not
only on all the conditions. . prevailing within the municipality and its needs
... but also on the nature of the entire region in which the municipality is lo-
cated and the use to which the land in that region has been or may be put most
advantageously. The effective development of a region should not and cannot be
made to depend on the adventitious location of municipal boundaries.
Id at 513, 64 A.2d at 349-50.
The Duffeon court's view contrasts with the traditional approach of courts which
requires only that a municipality consider the welfare of the zoned unit. See Com-
ment, Exclusionary Zoning: An Overview, 47 TUL. L. Rv. 1056 (1973).
16. In recent years there has been a public tendency to favor more provincial land
uses. With the rise of the environmental movement in the late 1960s and early 1970s,
resource conservation became a widely approved value, and restrictions on rapid sub-
urban growth received a more sympathetic response from commentators. See, e.g.,
Freilich and Ragsdale, Timing and Sequential Controls-The Essential Basisfor Effec-
tive Regional Planning: An Analysis of the New Directionsfor Land Use Control in the
Minneapolis-St. Paul Region, 58 MINN. L. REv. 1009 (1974); Deutsch, Land Use
Growth Controls 4 Case Study of San Jose and Livermore, California, 15 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 1 (1974); Note, Time Controls on Land Use: Prophylactic Lawfor
Planners, 57 CORNELL L. REv. 827 (1972). See also Marcus, Mandatory Development
Rights Transfer and the Taking Clause: The Case of Manhattan's Tudor City Parks, 24
BUFFALO L. REV. 77 (1974).
Many commentators in the early 1970s, however, argued that judicially approved
controls on growth were functionally indistinguishable from regulations previously
deemed too exclusionary. See, e.g., Bosselman, Can the Town ofRamapo Pass a Law
to Bind the Rights of the Whole World?, 1 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 234 (1973).
Professor Ellickson, an eminent authority on growth management, has noted that
much of the housing inhibited by growth control measures would be superior in qual-
ity to most current housing. Ellickson, supra note 1, at 490. Ellickson would modify
the Mount Laurel holding by allowing suburbs to impose elite standards for housing
construction if they are willing to compensate persons injured by those standards. Id
at 506.
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I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE "FAIR SHARE" DOCTRINE
Golden v. Planning Board of Town of Ramapo,17 the watershed case
for the standard of judicial review in growth management cases,
prefigured the present-day balancing of local growth limitations
against the regional repercussions of those limitations.'8 In Ramapo,
the town initiated a phased eighteen-year capital improvement pro-
gram prescribing the location and sequence of capital improvements
for essential public services and facilities. This multifaceted program
resulted from planning studies contemplating maximum develop-
ment. 9 Critical to the court's approval of Ramapo's growth manage-
ment plan was the lack of permanent restrictions on development.20
Rather than impose an absolute limit on the rate of future growth,
Ramapo had imposed temporary restrictions upon land use in resi-
17. 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1972), appeal dismissed,
409 U.S. 1003 (1972). The municipality in Ramapo conditioned residential develop-
ment upon issuance of special permits. The municipality based the issuance of the
permits on availability of designated essential services, such as sewers, parks, schools,
and roads. Id at 368, 285 N.E.2d at 295, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 143-44. The rationale of
the Ramapo plan was to coordinate residential growth with the town's timetable for
providing facilities and services. Id See generally Freiich, Interim Development Con-
trols: Essential Toolsfor Implementing Flexible Planning and Zoning, 49 J. URB. L. 65
(1971).
18. The Ramapo court did not specifically discuss the regional implications of the
town's growth control measures, but it did focus on factors of efficiency and fairness.
The court stated:
We only require that communities confront the challenge of population growth
with open doors. Where in grappling with that problem, the community under-
takes, by imposing temporary restrictions upon development, to provide required
municipal services in a rational manner, courts are rightfully reluctant to strike
down such schemes.
30 N.Y.2d at 379, 285 N.E.2d at 302, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 153. See generally Symposium,
supra note 3, at 165-66 & n.38.
19. 30 N.Y.2d at 368, 285 N.E.2d at 295, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 143.
One federal district court found that a restrictive development plan which could not
accommodate expected, natural growth was arbitrary and therefore unconstitutional.
The appellate court, however, reversed because the trial court had imposed a standard
of review stricter than the rational relationship test. Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City
of Petaluma, 375 F. Supp. 574 (N.D. Cal. 1974), rev'd, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976).
20. 30 N.Y.2d at 378, 285 N.E.2d at 302, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 152. Accord Steel Hill
Dev., Inc. v. Town of Sanborton, 469 F.2d 956, 961-62 (Ist Cir. 1972) (great increase
in minimum lost size sustained only as a stop-gap growth control mechanism; differ-
ent result if the new minimum lot size were permanent). See Symposium, supra note
3, at 144, for an extensive discussion of growth management criteria and public values
and concerns underlying growth management policies.
[Vol. 23:407
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dential areas while contemporaneously committing itself to a pro-
gram of development.2 ' In effect, Ramapo utilized a comprehensive
development plan,22 coupling growth restrictions with large scale
provisions for low and moderate income housing.2" The New York
court considered the growth management plan, both at its inception
and implementation, as a reasonable attempt to provide for the se-
quential, orderly development of land in accordance with the needs
of the community.24
The landmark case to date for espousal of the regional need princi-
ple is Southern Burlington County NAA CP v. Township ofMount Lau-
rel.25 The court in Mount Laurel went beyond the mere enunciation
of principle, however, by requiring the defendant-township to make
affirmative provision for its "fair share"26 of the housing needs of the
21, 30 N.Y. 2d at 378, 285 N.E.2d at 302, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 152.
22. Id. at 380, 285 N.E.2d at 303, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 153.
23. Id The court's concern that the development plan provide low and moderate
income housing was a precursor to the more express egalitarianism pervading the
"fair share" cases. See notes 27, 30, 34 infra. See generally Symposium, supra note 3,
at 187.
24. 30 N.Y.2d at 380, 285 N.E.2d at 303, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 153 (1972). Thus,
Ramapo's growth control program satisfied the "rational relation" standard of review.
Contra City of Boca Raton v. Boca Villas Corp., 371 So.2d 154 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1979). InBoca Raton, a zoning ordinance created an absolute limit of forty thousand
additional dwelling units within the city boundaries. Because the ceiling was not
based on a reasonable, balanced assessment of the growth potential of the city, the
court invalidated the ordinance. "[A]n excessive restriction on the use of private
property which does not contribute substantially to the public health, morals, safety,
and welfare is arbitrary and unreasonable and thus unconstitutional." 371 So.2d at
157.
25. 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975).
26. Id at 179-80, 336 A.2d at 724-25. Justice Hall, the writer of the Mount Laurel
opinion, stated that the limitation in types of homes, minimum lot and floor size re-
quirements, and the disproportionately large amount of land zoned industrial consti-
tuted a prima facie breach of the town's fair share duty. Id at 183-85, 336 A.2d at
729-30. See generally MANDELKER, supra note 4, at 445-574.
Other state courts have also espoused the "fair share" principle. For example, the
court in Waynesborough Corp. v. Easttown Zoning Hearing Bd., 23 Pa. Commw. Ct.
137, 350 A.2d 895 (1976), articulated factors that a court may consider in applying the
"fair share" principle: (1) percentage of land made available for multiple family use,
id at 142, 350 A.2d at 897 & n.3; (2) history of zoning within the locality in question,
id, 350 A.2d at 898; (3) whether the locality is a logical place for development oppor-
tunity, id at 143, 350 A.2d at 898, quoting Girsh Appeal, 437 Pa. 237, 245, 263 A.2d
396, 398 (1970).
The court in Waynesborough also stated that a locality cannot implement a zoning
scheme that makes no reasonable provision for apartment uses. 23 Pa. Commw. Ct.
1982]
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region. Specifically, Mount Laurel and other "developing" commu-
nities27 in New Jersey would have to make available an appropriate
amount of suitable land for low and moderate income housing.28
Only a demonstration of unusual circumstances could excuse this af-
firmative obligation.29
at 142, 350 A.2d at 897-98, quoting Girsh Appeal, 437 Pa. 237, 243, 263 A.2d 395, 398
(1970). Such a scheme would directly violate the "fair share" principle.
Finally, the Waynesborough court asserted that intent to exclude is not necessary to
make a growth control policy unconstitutional. "When other facts and circumstances
indicate an unreasonable restriction on the use of land for multifamily dwellings, a
conclusion that the ordinance is unconstitutional will stand without a finding of intent
to exclude." 23 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 143, 350 A.2d at 898.
27. For what constitutes a "developing" community, see Rose and Levin, What is
a "Developing Municipality" Within the Meaning of the Mount Laurel Decision?, in 4
REAL EST. L. J. 359 (1976).
In Glenview Dev. Co. v. Franklin Township, 164 N.J. Super. 563, 397 A.2d 384
(1978), the court discerned a six-point test in Mount Laurel for characterizing a "de-
veloping municipality." The six points are: (1) sizeable land area; (2) location
outside the central cities and other built-up suburbs; (3) substantially divested of ru-
ral characteristics; (4) great population increase since World War II or presently un-
dergoing a great increase; (5) not completely developed; (6) situated for inevitable
future residential, commercial and industrial demand and growth. Id at 567-68, 397
A.2d at 386.
As expected, New Jersey courts after Mount Laurel did not apply the "fair share"
principle to "non-developing" municipalities. See, e.g., Pascack Ass'n v. Mayor of
Wash. Township, 74 N.J. 470, 379 A.2d 6 (1977); Windmill Estates v. Zoning Bd. of
Adjustment, 147 N.J. Super. 65, 370 A.2d 541 (1976).
28. One land use analyst claims that the ad hoc "fair share" approach derives
from the impracticality of imposing a uniform standard on every municipality in a
region. One municipality may be suited for many more land uses than another. See
Hall, A Review of The Mount Laurel Decision, in AFTER MOUNT LAUREL: THE NEw
SUBURBAN ZONING 44 (1977). For criticism of the approach taken in Mount Laurel,
see Ellickson, supra note 1, at 505-06.
The "fair share" requirement is meant to benefit low- and moderate-income resi-
dents of a region. Two recent New Jersey decisions held that the concept does not
imply a duty to provide, housing for middle- or upper-income groups. Castroll v.
Township of Franklin, 161 N.J. Super. 190, 391 A.2d 544 (1978) (variance for garden
apartment complex denied); Swiss Village Assocs. v. Township of Wayne, 162 N.J.
Super. 138, 392 A.2d 596 (1978) (zoning amendment to permit high rent apartments
denied).
The reasoning in Mount Laurel was that, because localities have regional responsi-
bilities to promote the general welfare and because housing is a component of the
general welfare concept, localities have a duty through their land use plan to "make
realistically possible an appropriate variety and choice of housing." 67 N.J. at 174,
336 A.2d at 724.
29. Id, 336 A.2d at 724-25 (1975). Professor Ellickson, on the other hand, gener-
ally favors an activist judicial role with respect to distribution of a community's lim-
ited resources. Ellickson, supra note 1, at 511.
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Pointing out that the local zoning authority acts only as a delegate
of the state's police power,3" the Mount Laurel court stated that the
determinant of the "fair share" obligation is whether the zoning regu-
lations or policies under review have a substantial external impact.31.
If a substantial external impact exists, the municipality must not only
consider, but also take steps to promote the welfare of the state's citi-
zens beyond its borders. Conversely, the municipality cannot adopt
regulations or policies which thwart the opportunity of any category
of persons in the region to live within the municipal boundaries. 2
In a subsequent New Jersey case, Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v.
Townshi of Madison,33 the court declined to fashion a judicial rule
for determining "fair share" issues. It left the questions of regional
need and "fair share" to be decided on a case by case basis.34 The
Madison court noted that Mount Laurel had not devised a formula
for estimating "fair share," and added that such a formulation re-
mains the province of those with the requisite expertise:35 the munic-
ipal planning adviser, the county planning boards, and the state
36planning agency. In essence, the court believed that the problem of
30. State courts have traditionally showed great respect for Dillon's Rule, which
calls for the strict construction of municipal powers under state enabling acts. See 1 J.
DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 448-55 (5th ed. 1911).
31. 67 N.J. 151, 177, 336 A.2d 713, 726 (1975).
32. The geographical scope of the region whose public welfare must be considered
presents a definitional problem to the courts. In Associated Home Builders v. City of
Livermore, 18 Cal.3d 582, 607 n.24, 557 P.2d 473, 487-88 n.24, 135 Cal. Rptr. 55-56
n.25 (1976), the California Supreme Court stated that the trial court should determine
the size of a region significantly affected by a land use restriction as a question of fact.
After making this factual determination, the trial court could assess whether the con-
tested restriction reasonably relates to the regional welfare. Id at 601, 607, 557 P.2d
at 483, 487, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 51, 55 (1976).
Following the ground breaking Mount Laurel decision, the township revised its
zoning ordinance. A New Jersey trial court found the revised ordinances valid, ex-
cept for a few provisions. The trial court, applying the "fair share" requirement,
invalidated the ordinance's total exclusion of mobile homes. Southern Burlington
County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 161 N.J. Super. 317, 391 A.2d 935
(1978).
33. 72 N.J. 481, 371 A.2d 1192 (1977).
34. Id at 541-42, 371 A.2d at 1222. The Oakwood Court stated emphatically that
the task of devising a formula for estimating the "fair share" requirement was not a
task for the courts. Id
35. Id. at 541, 371 A.2d at 1222.
36. Id The court imposed the duty on these municipal land use strategists to
"adjust. . .zoning regulations so as to render possible the 'least cost' housing, consis-
tent with minimum standards of health and safety, which private industry will under-
1982]
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devising a "fair share" formula was a legislative and administrative
one.
37
In Berenson v. Town of New Castle,38 the New York Court of Ap-
peals imposed a two-fold obligation. First, the court agreed with the
Mount Laurel approach that a developing municipality must take re-
gional needs into consideration. Second, the court recognized the
necessity of assessing the community's needs-inquiring whether the
town's growth management plan provided for a balanced, well-or-
dered community.39 Berenson recognized that most communities dif-
fer substantially from each other, hence what is appropriate for one
community may be grossly inappropriate for another.40
Significantly, the Berenson court declined to adopt in New York as
extensive a "fair share" requirement as found under the New Jersey
rule. Berenson reiterated judicial interest in a regional standard, but
held that a community need not permit a land use solely for the sake
of the residents of the region if the region adequately provides for
their needs.4' The court stated that an ordinance was not invalid as a
matter of law for bearing an insubstantial relation to the "public
health, safety, morals or general welfare"42 if other areas in the com-
munity at large fulfilled regional and local needs for low and moder-
take, and in amounts sufficient to satisfy the deficit in the hypothesized fair share."
Id at 512, 371 A.2d at 1207.
The Oakwood court noted that market economics stood in the way of the produc-
tion of multi-family housing, and therefore stated that "developing communities"
should use density bonuses as an incentive to build such houses. Id at 516-17, 371
A.2d at 1209. Although the court held that a developing municipality should act
affirmatively to help provide for sufficient lower-income housing, it did not extend
this affirmative duty to include an obligation that the municipality build or subsidize
multi-family housing. Id at 499, 517, 371 A.2d at 1200, 1209.
37. Id at 541-42, 371 A.2d at 1222.
38. 38 N.Y.2d 102, 341 N.E.2d 236 (1975).
39. Id at 109, 341 N.E.2d at 242 (1975). The court did not impose a requirement
that each zone contain balanced housing. Instead, the stated goal of the court was
development of a balanced community which would make efficient use of the town's
land. Id at 109, 341 N.E.2d at 241-42.
40. Id. at 108, 341 N.E.2d at 240.
41. Like the New Jersey court in Oakwood, the New York Court of Appeals in
Berenson did not mandate a quantitative proportion between various types of devel-
opment. The Berenson court explained that such a rigid requirement would militate
against the stated goal of orderly municipal development to meet public needs. Id at
109, 341 N.E.2d at 241-42.
42. See definition of "police power," note 1 supra.
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ate income housing.43
On remand, the trial court imposed a housing quota and other spe-
cific limitations on growth control upon the town's zoning authori-
ties.' New York's intermediate court of appeals overturned these
limitations.45 The appellate court held that "fair share" was not
meant to cover market-rate housing." In effect, the court abstained
from stretching Mount Laurel's "fair share" requirement to the point
of strict, detailed judicial control over the substantive terms of growth
management programs.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision in Surrick v. Zoning
Hearing Board of Township of Upper Providence47 further illustrates
the spreading influence of the Mount Laurel court's emphasis on the
regional welfare. In Surrick, the court adopted the "fair share" ap-
proach to exclusionary zoning.4" At one point in the opinion, the
court recognized the common concern that adoption of the "fair
share" test forces courts to perform functions that are legislative or
administrative in nature.49 Nevertheless, the Surrick court devised
its own analytic procedure for judging subsequent exclusionary zon-
ing cases. It considered the percentage of zoned community land
available for multiple-family dwellings, current population growth
43. 38 N.Y.2d at 111, 341 N.E.2d at 243 (1975).
44. For an account of the trial court's decision, see 30 ZONING DIG. 11 (No. 2
1978).
45. Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 67 A.D.2d 506, 415 N.Y.S.2d 669 (1979).
46. Id at 521, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 678. Moreover, the court asserted that the trial
court's imposition of a "fair share" quota had no support in case law or public policy.
Id The court noted that even the more demanding New Jersey and Pennsylvania
courts had not imposed quotas. Id at 521-22, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 678. Third, the court
said that a specific judicial order was not the proper way to react to unmet local or
regional need for multi-family housing. Instead, judicial intervention into local hous-
ing policy should limit itself to a determination of the degree of reasonableness exem-
plified by local planning. Id at 522, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 679.
47. 476 Pa. 182, 382 A.2d 105.
48. Id at 198-201, 382 A.2d at 114-15 (Roberts, J., concurring). Justice Roberts
expressed concern about excessive judicial intervention into local planning matters.
Specifically, Roberts protested the adoption in Pennsylvania of the "fair share"
framework for analyzing zoning ordinances. Id at 200-01, 382 A.2d at 115. But cf.
Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 111, 341 N.E.2d 236, 243 (1975)
("[I]t is quite anomalous that a court should be required to perform the tasks of a
regional planner. . . .Until the day comes when regional, rather than local, govern-
mental units can make such determinations, the courts must assess the reasonableness
of what the locality has done.").
49. 476 Pa. at 191, 382 A.2d at 109. See text accompanying note 38 supra.
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pressure within the locality and region, and total amount of undevel-
oped land in the township. 0 The Surrick court concluded that the
ordinance under its review did not provide a "fair share" of township
land for development of multi-family dwellings.51
Finally, the California Supreme Court recently adopted a regional
need approach to exclusionary zoning ordinances.52 In Associated
Home Builders v. Livermore,53 the California Supreme Court ex-
panded the breadth of its review of zoning ordinances from the wel-
fare of the municipality to the welfare of the region 4 where the
ordinance has significant regional impact.5 Despite expressions of
judicial deference to municipal zoning ordinances throughout the
opinion,56 the court emphasized the pressing need for its adoption of
a broader scale of review.5 7
50. Id at 194-95, 382 A.2d at 111.
51. The court based this conclusion on the fact that the ordinance provided only a
little more than one percent of the township's land for multi-family housing. In addi-
tion, multi-family housing was but one of more than a dozen uses permitted on this
very small percentage of land. Id at 195-96, 382 A.2d at 111-12. See generally Com-
ment, The Pennsylvania Supreme Court and Exclusionary Suburban Zoning: From
Bilbar to Girsh-4 Decade of Change, 16 VILL. L. REv. 507 (1971) (development of
judicial sensitivity to regional needs and the duty of the suburbs to provide for them).
52. Though the California Supreme Court did not exercise explicit "fair share"
review, its adoption of a regional needs test clearly expressed the egalitarian values
underlying the "fair share" concept.
53. 18 Cal.3d 582, 557 P.2d 473, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1976).
54. Id at 607, 557 P.2d at 487, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 55.
55. Id at 601, 557 P.2d at 483, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 51.
56. Id at 601, 604-05, 610, 557 P.2d at 483, 485, 486, 489, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 51, 53,
54, 57.
The California Supreme Court in Livermore distinguished the absolute, impartial
ban on all residential construction effected by the land use ordinance under its review
from ordinances banning or limiting only less expensive forms of housing. The latter
tends primarily to exclude would-be residents on grounds of race and wealth, a factor
warranting a stricter level of review than the "reasonable means" test. Id at 601, 557,
P.2d at 484, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 52.
57. Id. at 607, 557 P.2d at 487-88, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 55-56.
The movement in California towards a broader, more encompassing review of local
land use planning took a dramatic step forward in 1980. That year the California
legislature extensively revised certain legislation to require localities to consider re-
gional housings needs as a mandatory housing element of their comprehensive plans.
The legislation codifies the Mount Laurel "fair share" rule. See MANDELKER, supra
note 4, at 103-05 (1981 Supp.).
CAL. Gov'T. CODE § 65584(a) (Deering Supp. 1982) states:
[A] locality's share of the regional housing needs includes that share of the hous-
ing need of persons at all income levels within the area significantly affected by a
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II. FINDING A MIDDLE GROUND
In retrospect, the promise of balanced growth supplied by the
Ramapo planning scheme58 has hardened into judicial doctrine in
some states. Mount Laurel's "fair share" principle gave life to the
aspect of compromise inherent in Ramapo-type ordinances between
the positive capacity for growth in a developing community" and the
public desire to moderate the rate of growth. The value of egalitarian
humanism' embodied in the Mount Laurel opinion has affected de-
cisions of other state courts. In a time of adjustment and readjust-
ment at all levels of government to vanishing, finite resources, the
notion of a municipal duty to accommodate regional needs is gather-
ing momentum.
It is conceptually convenient to view the Berenson6" decision as a
half-way point between the extremely deferential "reasonably" or
"substantially related means" standard of review62 and the more de-
jurisdiction's general plan. The distribution of regional housing needs shall...
take into consideration market demand for housing, employment opportunities,
the availability of suitable sites and public facilities, commuting patterns, type
and tenure of housing need, and the housing needs of farm-workers. The distri-
bution shall seek to avoid further impaction of localities with relatively high pro-
portions of lower income households....
In addition, revised CAL. EVID. CODE § 669.5(a)-(b) (Deering Supp. 1982) makes the
procedural burden on localities much more severe:
§ 669.5(a) Any ordinance enacted by the governing body of a city, county, or
city and county which directly limits, by number, (1) the building permits that
may be issued for residential construction or (2) the buildable lots which may be
developed for residential purposes, ispresumed to have an impact on the supply
of residential units available in an area which includes territory outside the juris-
diction of such city, county, or city and county. (Emphasis added).
(b) With respect to any action which challenges the validity of such an ordi-
nance, the city, county, or city and county enacting such ordinance shall bear the
burden of proof that such ordinance is necessary for the protection of the public
health, safety, or welfare of the population of such city, county, or city and
county. (Emphasis added).
Section 669.5(b) apparently implies the "strict scrutiny" standard of judicial review.
58. See notes 17-25 and accompanying text supra.
59. See note 28 supra.
60. Associated Home Builders Y. City of Lermore characterized the competing
interests involved in land use restriction cases as egalitarian humanists and environ-
mental protectionists. 18 Cal.3d 582, 608, 557 P.2d 473, 488, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41, 56
(1976).
61. See notes 39-47 and accompanying text supra.
62, See note I supra; (Associated Home Builders v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal.3d
582, 604, 607, 557 P.2d 473, 485, 487, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41, 53, 55).
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manding impositions of the Mount Laurel court.63 While Berenson
required municipal consideration of regional need, it did not formu-
late a substantive standard by which to bind municipal zoning ex-
perts.' Thus, Berenson imposed some limitations upon exclusionary
zoning ordinances, while simultaneously giving municipalities sub-
stantial elbow room in which to maneuver around nettlesome re-
source allocation problems.
Similarly, the court in Livermore stated the obligation of munici-
palities to satisfy a broad, undefined regional welfare standard,65
without imposing specific implementation requirements. Advocates
of the "fair share" plan can justifiably criticize the Livermore ap-
proach for upholding a total, albeit temporary, ban66 on residential
construction. Despite its sincere tone, Livermore may have merely
paid lip service to the egalitarian value of providing housing for out-
lying regional areas. Nonetheless the California court, heretofore ex-
tremely deferential to local zoning programs, expanded the welfare
obligation of municipalities.
In view of the cases discussed, Berenson represents the preferable
approach to review of exclusionary zoning ordinances. The Berenson
court reasonably asserted that there is no requirement for a munici-
pality to make room for a land use if an appraisal of regional needs
indicates that those needs are being otherwise satisfied.67 Thus, the
63. Cf Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 375 F. Supp. 574 (N.D.
Cal. 1974), rev'd 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cer. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976). (appli-
cation of the "strict scrutiny" test to a municipal ordinance severely limiting residen-
tial construction reversed).
64. 38 N.Y.2d at 109, 341 N.E.2d at 242.
65. 18 Cal.3d at 607, 557 P.2d at 487-88, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 55-56.
The land use doctrines that have evolved in the New Jersey, New York, Penn-
sylvania, and California courts were designed to offset the exclusionary impact of
local growth restrictions deemed undesirable by these courts. These doctrines stress
three related concepts: (1) Even in the absence of legislation, state courts have an
obligation to factor regional needs into the process of judicial review. (2) The re-
gional focus should be implemented by the imposition of a substantive duty on "de-
veloping" communities to bear their "fair share" of regional housing needs.
(3) There should be a requirement that "developing" communities subsidize some
forms of development because to adopt a "new growth must pay its own way" philos-
ophy will have consequences deemed socially undesirable by the courts.
But cf Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 72 N.J. at 517-18, 371
A.2d at 1200, note 37 supra (court did not require municipalities to build or subsidize
multi-family housing); Symposium, supra note 3, at 34-35.
66. 18 Cal.3d at 589 & n.2, 557 P.2d at 475-76 & n.2, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 43-44 & n.2.
67. 38 N.Y.2d at 110-11, 341 N.E.2d at 242-43.
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Berenson court saw community diversity as an important, positive
value, if not attained at the expense of the region. Finally the Beren-
son court, by imposing a regional standard without articulating a
substantive standard such as "fair share," allowed localities consider-
able planning flexibility. At the same time, however, the court made
clear that it would exercise procedural oversight by requiring the de-
velopment of regional data, projections on regional needs, and other
planning measures. This type of judicial review puts the initial re-
sponsibility on communities to determine a fair balancing of local
and regional needs. It also allows the reviewing court to avoid entan-
glements in the fundamental aspects of planning.
III. CONCLUSION
The new "fair share" ideology requires a delicate balance between
the state courts' right of review and local prerogative. State enabling
acts and state court review should allow municipalities, given their
immediate relation to local growth management problems, the upper
hand in policy control and direction. Otherwise, state courts may
usurp, beyond their range of competence, sophisticated planning
functions ill-suited to judicial determination. So long as state courts
assume the restrained approach of the Berenson court, the "fair
share" ideology can produce greater fairness without unduly burden-
ing growth management planners.
Frank A. Rubin
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